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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules needed for a determination of this case are included in the
argument section of this brief•
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with distributing
a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992) and possession of
a controlled substance with intent to distribute, also a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv)
(Supp, 1992) (R. 9). Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the
latter count was amended to reflect a charge of possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1992) (R. 9). Defendant
entered pleas of guilty to each count as charged in the amended
information (R. 67).
Based on the State's recommendation made pursuant to
the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to
concurrent prison terms of 1 to 15 years on count I and zero to 5
years on count II.

It then stayed the execution of those

sentences and placed defendant on probation for three years.
Among the terms of probation was a requirement that defendant
spend 120 days in the county jail. However, the trial court
ordered that defendant serve that time in home confinement with a
work release exception (R. 112-13, 190-93; Transcript of Hearing
on Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas, dated March 18,
2

1992, at 123 [hereinafter "Tr."])STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant was the target of an investigation directed
by the Davis County Metro Narcotics Strike Force.

The strike

force sent an undercover officer to the residence at which
defendant was residing (the home of defendant's parents) to
complete a controlled drug buy.

The agent carried a "wire," and

the transaction was recorded by police.

A search warrant for the

residence was then obtained and executed (Tr. 124-25).
Police recovered "a substantial quantity" of cocaine,
drug paraphernalia, and materials for packaging and distributing
narcotics.

Defendant's codefendant, Weaver, was present when the

warrant was executed.

At the time, Weaver was in possession of a

controlled substance, and he was charged accordingly.

Defendant

was charged with distributing a controlled substance and with
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
(R. 124-25).
As the trial court noted in its findings, public
defender Michael Murphy was appointed to represent both defendant
and Weaver (R. 202). (A copy of the trial court's findings of
fact and conclusions of law is attached hereto as Addendum A.)
Mr. Murphy met with defendant several times (R. 203-4; Tr. 86-8).
Weaver was also present at at least one of those meetings, most
likely their first one. Mr. Murphy discussed the possibility of
a conflict arising if one of the two wished to testify against
the other, and both defendants indicated that they had no desire
3

to testify against one another because they were good friends.
Defendant and Weaver both agreed that they wanted to be
represented by Mr. Murphy (R. 204).
Sometime later, Mr. Murphy arranged for the three to
listen to the surveillance tape of the drug transaction.

After

listening to the tape, Mr. Murphy again asked defendant if he was
interested in testifying against Weaver or cooperating with the
State in some other capacity.
of Weaver's presence.

This conversation occurred outside

Mr. Murphy also pursued the same issues

with Weaver outside of defendant's presence (Tr. 85, 89). Again,
both defendant and Weaver rejected the idea of testifying against
each other and expressed their desire to go forward to assert
their innocence (R. 204; Tr. 89).
Mr. Murphy also reviewed the police reports with
defendant, filed and argued a motion to suppress the evidence
that formed the basis of the charges against defendant and
Weaver, and met with defendant to prepare for the suppression
hearing.

After the trial court denied defendant's motion to

suppress, Mr. Murphy explained the court's ruling to defendant
and discussed possible plea negotiations as well as again asking
whether defendant would be interesting in working for the Davis
County Metro Strike Force (R. 202; Tr. 88).
Throughout his representation of defendant, Mr. Murphy
also had several discussions with the prosecutor (R. 203),
William McGuire, about the State's willingness to reduce the
charges against defendant in return for defendant's cooperation,
4

as well as what sentencing recommendations the State would make
(Tr. 96, 127).
Mr. Murphy eventually secured a plea bargain for
defendant.

The terms of the plea bargain were as follows:

1) the State would amend the information to reflect charges of
distribution of a controlled substance, a third degree felony,
and would reduce the charge of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, also a second degree felony,
to simple possession, a third degree felony; 2) the State would
recommend that concurrent sentences be imposed; 3) the State
would recommend that defendant serve no time in prison, but be
placed on probation; and finally 4) the State would recommend
that any jail time imposed include a work release provision (R.
112-13; Tr. 123).
Mr. Murphy explained the proposed agreement to
defendant, and defendant was initially reluctant to accept the
offer because he was concerned about his ability to work and keep
his business operational if he were to be incarcerated (Tr. 923).

Mr. Murphy then explained to defendant that, "based upon

[his] experience . . . before Judge Cornaby . . . and based upon
the recommendation of the prosecutor, that work release on this
matter would be highly likely a possibility.

But [Mr. Murphy]

clearly indicated that [he could not] make any promises" (Tr.
93).

Defendant was reassured and decided that he would plead

guilty (Tr. 93-7).
The matter had been set for trial on January 9, 1992.
5

However, prior to that date, Mr. Murphy conveyed defendant's
desire to accept the plea agreement to Mr. McGuire (R. 203; Tr.
97).

At the time that Mr. Murphy indicated that defendant would

plead guilty, it was anticipated that Weaver would go to trial
(R. 203; Tr. 94).
On January 9, 1992, Mr. Murphy and Mr. McGuire met with
defendant and confirmed his desire to plead guilty.

According to

both attorneys, defendant was primarily interested in knowing
what sentence he would receive and was particularly concerned
that he be allowed to serve any jail time on a work release
basis.

The plea agreement was again explained to defendant, and

he reaffirmed his desire to accept the plea agreement (Tr. 99,
123).

Although the record indicates that Weaver decided that he

would also enter a plea of guilty (Tr. 62), it does not reflect
what sentencing recommendations the State made in that case.
Defendant later moved to withdraw his pleas, claiming
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his
counsel, who represented both defendant and his co-defendant, had
a conflict of interest.

The trial court required defendant to

demonstrate that counsel had an actual conflict of interest
because neither defendant nor his co-defendant ever claimed that
there was a conflict before defendant entered his pleas (R. 203).
The trial court further found that •' [i]nasmuch as
neither was going to testify against the other, the two
defendants were satisfied there was no conflictf, and] Mr. Murphy
was satisfied that no actual conflict existed" (R. 204). After
6

determining that defendant's counsel had no actual conflict of
interest, the trial court rejected defendant's claim and denied
his motion to withdraw his pleas (R. 205).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant advances two claims on appeal.

First, he

claims that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty
pleas because the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry into
counsel's alleged conflict of interest before it accepted
defendant's pleas.

Second, defendant claims he was denied his

right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel had
an actual conflict of interest.
Under State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990),
defendant's claims must fail.

First, neither defendant nor his

co-defendant ever raised the issue of a potential conflict of
interest prior to when defendant entered his pleas of guilty.
The mere fact that counsel represented both defendants did not
oblige the trial court to investigate the possibility that a
conflict existed.

Consequently, in order to make out his claim

of ineffective representation, defendant had to establish that
his counsel had an actual conflict of interest.
Just as he has done on appeal, defendant below did
little more than propose a scenario under which counsel had a
possible conflict of interest.

Under the circumstances, the

trial court properly found that defendant had failed to prove
that his counsel had an actual conflict as required under Webb.
This Court should therefore hold that the trial court did not
7

abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to withdraw
his pleas and affirm defendant's convictions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO
INQUIRE INTO DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ALLEGED
CONFLICT OF INTEREST BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS
NEVER RAISED UNTIL DEFENDANT FILED HIS MOTION
TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.
In accepting defendant's pleas, the trial court fully
complied with the requirements of rule 11, and defendant does not
contend otherwise.

Rather, defendant argues that the trial court

failed to investigate the possibility that counsel's
representation of both defendant and his codefendant created a
conflict of interest, and that the court therefore abused its
discretion by refusing to allow defendant to withdraw his pleas.
As demonstrated below, defendant's claim is predicated on a
faulty reading of this Court's opinion in State v. Webb, 790 P.2d
65 (Utah App. 1990) .
In Webb, this Court made clear that although "trial
judges [have a duty] to investigate any timely objections to
multiple representation, the sixth amendment does not require
state court judges to initiate sua sponte inquiries into the
propriety of an attorney's representation of codefendants in
every case[.],f

id. at 72-3 (relying on Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446

U.S. 335, 346-46, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1717-18 (1980) and United
States v. Burnev, 756 F.2d 787, 790-93 (10th Cir. 1985)).
Consequently, where a defendant neither objects to multiple
8

representation nor raises a conflict of interest issue, the sixth
amendment does not require the trial court to initiate an
inquiry.

Id.* a t 73.
In this case, the trial court found that neither

defendant nor his codefendant ever "raise[d] an objection or
assert[ed] a question concerning the[ir] [joint] representation
by [trial counsel, and there] was no claim at all of a conflict
[of interest]" (R. 203). Nor is there any evidence in the record
that suggests the trial court "kn[ew] or reasonably should [have]
know[n] that a particular conflict exist[ed].M

Webb, 790 P.2d at

73 (citations omitted).
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's finding
that neither he nor his codefendant ever raised the issue of a
possible conflict of interest.

However, he does allege that the

trial court had a duty to initiate an inquiry because the court
knew or should have known that a conflict existed (Br. of
Appellant at 7). Specifically, defendant claims that because his
codefendant was charged with a "substantially lesser" offense,
the trial court should have known that counsel was conflicted
insofar as "[p]lausible alternative strategies, including plea
bargaining in exchange for one co-defendant's testimony against
the other, or shifting the blame toward one in an effort to
exonerate another, could not be pursued without adversely
affecting one of the co-defendants" (Br. of Appellant at 8).
Defendant provides no legal analysis and cites no
authority to support this claim.

On that basis alone, this Court
9

should reject defendant's claim.

See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d

1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support
[his] argument [with] any legal analysis or authority, we decline
to rule on it."); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah App.)
("[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of
argument and research.").
Moreover, defendant's assertion ignores the fact "that
a possible conflict of interest inheres in almost every instance
of multiple representation[.]" Webb, 790 P.2d at 73 (citation
omitted).

Each of the possible conflicts to which defendant

alludes may be present whenever counsel represents multiple
parties.

Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the

issue of a possible conflict of interest was "brought home" to
the trial court to any greater degree than would be true in
nearly every case in which there is representation of multiple
defendants.

Consequently, the trial court was under no

obligation to initiate a sua sponte inquiry into potential
conflicts of interests at the time it accepted defendant's pleas.
See id.; Cuvler, 446 U.S. at 346-46, 100 S. Ct. at 1717-18;
Burnev, 756 F.2d at 790-93.

Therefore, the fact that the trial

court did not conduct such an inquiry does not constitute "good
cause" to justify granting defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying defendant's motion.

See State v. Thorup, 200 Utah Adv.
10

Rep. 67, 68 (Utah App. November 13, 1992) (a trial court's denial
of a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that the trial
court abused its discretion).
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS
TRIAL COUNSEL HAD AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF
INTEREST. HIS CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVENESS
THEREFORE FAILSf AND THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS
SHOULD BE UPHELD.
Because the alleged conflict in this case was not
raised by defendant until after he entered his pleas, the trial
court properly required defendant to demonstrate that his counsel
had an actual conflict of interest which adversely affected his
counsel's performance.

Defendant failed to meet that burden, and

the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
This Court has recognized that a defendant who failed
object to multiple representation or to raise a conflict of
interest issue "can succeed on his sixth amendment
ineffectiveness of counsel claim only if he demonstrates both
that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that
an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance."

Webb, 790 P.2d at 75 (citations omitted).

See

also State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah App. 1991) (same
proposition as Webb).

However,

,f

[i]f the defendant makes such a

showing, prejudice need not be demonstrated to prevail on the
claim."

Johnson, 823 P.2d at 488. Rather, this Court "will
11

presume the defendant was prejudiced by the lawyer's
performance."

Id.

This Court in Webb articulated the following test for
demonstrating that an actual conflict existed:
In order to show an actual conflict of
interest existed, a defendant must point to
specific instances in the record to suggest
an actual conflict or impairment of his or
her interests. There is no violation where
the conflict is irrelevant or merely
hypothetical; there must be an actual,
significant conflict.
Id. (citations omitted).
This Court elaborated on the above standard by quoting
the following passage from an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
decision:
Appellants must make a factual showing of
inconsistent interests and must demonstrate
that the attorney "made a choice between
possible alternative courses of action. . . .
If he did not make such a choice, the
conflict remained hypothetical." . . . . An
actual conflict of interest exists when the
respective defenses of multiple defendants
are inconsistent, i.e., if "introduction of
probative evidence or plausible arguments
that would significantly benefit one
defendant would damage the defense of another
defendant whom the same counsel is
representing."
Webb, 790 P.2d at 75 (quoting United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d
1321, 1328 (11th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 464
U.S. 991, 104 S. Ct. 481 (1983)).
"Until a defendant shows an actual conflict, 'he has
not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of
ineffectiveness.'"

Jd.. (citation omitted).
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As demonstrated

below, defendant has not satisfied his burden of showing that his
counsel had an actual conflict of interest because he can make no
"factual showing of inconsistent interests."

Nor can he

demonstrate that counsel made a choice between possible
alternative courses of action.
Here, defendant alleges that counsel labored under an
actual conflict of interest because he "could not pursue
plausible strategies such as blame shifting or cooperation with
the prosecution"

(Br. of Appellant at 11). To support his

assertion, defendant claims that "both co-defendants were asked
by Mr. Murphy in each other's presence 'who's narking on who?'"
(Br. of Appellant at 10). That assertion distorts the record.1
According to Mr. Murphy, he spoke with both defendants
about the possibility of their testifying against one another,
but neither was willing to do so because of their close
friendship (Tr. 85). After listening to police surveillance
tapes of the drug transaction that formed the basis of the
charges, counsel again spoke with the defendants, this time
outside of each other's presence, about whether either of them
1

Although defendant cites to Mr. Murphy's testimony to
support his assertion that Mr. Murphy asked, "Who's narking on
who?" a review of the record indicates that it was defendant who
first testified that Mr. Murphy posed the question in the highly
inflammatory form quoted above (Tr. 12); Weaver later repeated it
(Tr. 57).
In contrast, Mr. Murphy expressly denied asking the
defendants the question in the form defendant has presented it in
his brief (Tr. 73). The fair inference to be drawn from the
trial court's ruling is that it was not persuaded that Mr. Murphy
posed the question quoted by defendant. Moreover, defendant's
recital of his own testimony while attributing it to Mr. Murphy
is inappropriate and potentially misleading.
13

was willing to testify against the other (Tr. 89). Both
defendants again indicated that they did not want to testify
against their friend and that they both wanted to go forward on
the basis that they were innocent of the charges against them
(Tr- 89).
With respect to this issue, the trial court entered the
following findings of fact:
16. After Mr. Murphy was assigned to
represent [defendant] and Mr. Weaver he met
with both of them simultaneously. Mr. M\irphy
had several meetings with [defendant]. The
matter of a potential conflict of interest
was discussed.
17. Mr. Weaver and [defendant] have
been and are good friends and have known each
other for many years. They work together.
18. Part of the discussion Mr. Murphy
had with [defendant] and Mr. Weaver concerned
the possibility of one of them testifying
against the other. Because of their
friendship neither was willing to do that.
Inasmuch as neither was willing to testify
against the other, the two defendants were
satisfied there was no conflict. Mr. Murphy
was satisfied that no conflict existed.
19. Both [defendant] and Mr. Weaver
agreed that Mr. Murphy could represent both
of them.
(R. 203-04) (emphasis added).
Defendant has not challenged the trial court's findings
of facts.

Nor has he presented any evidence that indicates his

counsel "made a choice between possible alternative courses of
action. . . . [or that] the respective defenses of [defendant and
his codefendant] [we]re inconsistent.]" Webb, 790 P.2d at 75
(citation omitted).

Rather, defendant has merely articulated a
14

"hypothetical" conflict; he has not demonstrated that it actually
developed.
Although defendant has described the sort of conflict
of interest that might

arise in cases of multiple representation,

that is a far cry from demonstrating that an actual conflict
existed in this case. Moreover, the record indicates that
counsel thought through the possible conflicts and discussed them
with defendant.

It was then for defendant to decide how he

wished to proceed.
Defendant could have chosen to serve as an informant or
he could have testified against his codefendant.

Although

defendant now claims that his counsel had an actual conflict of
interest that prevented him from considering such strategies, the
record establishes that his counsel did in fact investigate such
possible strategies as blame shifting and cooperation with the
prosecution.

However, just as did the defendant in Webb,

defendant decided to stand united with his friend instead of
breaking rank to testify against him.2
As the trial court recognized in its findings, Mr.
Murphy pursued a relatively vigorous defense, which included
moving to suppress the evidence that formed the basis of the
2

If, however, either defendant or Weaver had indicated that
they were interested in testifying against the other and counsel
had pursued that alternative while continuing to represent both
of the two men, then the conflict would no longer have been
merely hypothetical* In that circumstance, counsel could not
properly represent both defendants. Indeed, counsel in that
setting may even be duty bound to decline representation of
either defendant if he had obtained privileged information that
would have unfairly prejudiced either defendant.
15

charges against defendant (R. 204). Moreover, both Mr. Murphy
and Mr. McGuire testified that defendant was primarily concerned
with the issue of sentencing and especially wanted to be granted
work release status in the event he was ordered to serve time in
jail (Tr. 93-4, 123).
Mr. Murphy had extensive discussions with the
prosecutor and eventually negotiated a highly favorable plea
agreement for defendant that included reducing one of the second
degree felony charges to a third degree felony charge, as well as
recommendations by the State that the sentences run concurrently,
that defendant serve no time in prison and that any jail time
imposed be ordered on a work release basis (R. 112-13, Tr. 123).
Defendant opted to accept that plea agreement.
The trial court ultimately followed the State's
sentencing recommendations and even ordered that defendant serve
the 120 days of jail time in home confinement instead of at the
county jail (R. 203-04).

In light of the overwhelming evidence

admissible against defendant, particularly the police tape of the
drug sale that defendant made to an undercover officer, it
appears that Mr. Murphy did an outstanding job of negotiating a
plea on behalf of defendant.

Under these circumstances, it

cannot be said that "counsel's loyalty" was divided between
defendant and Weaver by an actual conflict of interest.

Webb,

790 P.2d at 76 (citations omitted).
To summarize briefly, the trial court was under no
obligation to initiate a sua sponte inquiry into the issue of
16

whether defendant's counsel was conflicted because defendant
never raised that issue until he moved to withdraw his pleas.
Nor did counsel have an actual conflict of interest that
adversely affected his representation of defendant.

The trial

court therefore acted well within its discretion in denying
defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas.

This Court should

therefore affirm defendant's convictions.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw
his pleas and affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7

day of February, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

QcM/i.
TODD A. UTZIWGER^
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Nick H. Porterfield, attorney for appellant, 345 South Main
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DESERTCT^
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER CONCERNING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
j

vs.

Case No. 91170 7289

GREG DENTON ELDER,

Hon. Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea on the 18th day of
March, 1992. The defendant was present in person and represented
by his attorney, Nick H. Porterfield. The State was represented by
Carvel

R.

Harward,

Chief

Deputy

Davis

County Attorney,

the

Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge, presided.
Based upon the file herein and the testimony produced at
the evidentiary hearing referred to in preceding paragraph, the
Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On the 9th day of January, 1992, Greg D. Elder,

above-named defendant, pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony and also to distribution of a
controlled substance, a felony of the second degree.

He was

represented by Michael Murphy who had been previously appointed.

2.

Thereafter, Nick H. Porterfield filed defendant's

motion for withdrawal of guilty plea. The motion is dated the 29th
day of January, 1992.
3.
filed.

A memorandum in support of defendant's motion was

The State filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's

motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea.
4. A transcript of the proceedings involving the guilty
plea has been prepared and made a part of the record.
5. The above-named defendant was originally charged with
distribution of cocaine, alleged to have occurred on the 23rd day
of May,

1991 and with possession of cocaine with intent to

distribute, alleged to have occurred the same date, each charge
being a second degree felony.

A co-defendant, Philip J. Weaver,

was charged with possession of cocaine in connection with the same
episode.
6.

Greg D. Elder appeared before the Circuit Court on

the 26th day of June, 1991.

At that time he had no attorney and

waived his preliminary hearing.

Stephen Oda was appointed to

represent the defendant. However, that appointment was changed at
a later date when Michael Murphy assumed Mr. Oda's public defender
caseload.
7.

On the 19th day of August, 1991, defendant's motion

to suppress evidence came on regularly for hearing.

The Court

denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and the matter
was set for trial.
8. William K. McGuire, attorney for the plaintiff in the
above-entitled action, had several discussions with Mr. Murphy.

9.

The matter was set for trial to be conducted on the

9th day of January, 1992.

Prior to that date, Mr. Murphy

communicated to Mr. McGuire that defendant, Greg D. Elder, would
plead guilty.

At the time Mr. Murphy indicated that defendant

Elder would plead guilty, it was anticipated that co-defendant
Weaver would go to trial.
10.

On January 9, 1992, the defendant Greg Elder, the

co-defendant, Philip Weaver, Bill McGuire as the prosecutor, and
Michael Murphy as defense attorney, appeared at the Court presided
over by Judge Cornaby.

Prospective jurors were available at the

Courthouse.
11.

Bill McGuire

and Michael

Murphy

had

several

conversations. Those two attorneys also had conversations with the
two defendants.
12.

Each defendant pled guilty.

13.

At no time did either defendant raise an objection

or assert a question concerning the representation by Mr. Murphy.
There was no claim at all of a conflict.
14.

A record was created concerning the entry of

defendant Elder's guilty plea. As referred to above, a transcript
of that proceeding has been produced.

The Court covered all

aspects of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
15. The parties were advised that a prospective jury was
available in the Courthouse. The Court accepted the guilty plea of
Mr. Elder to a second degree felony and also to a third degree
felony.

There was no trial and the jury was excused.
16. After Mr. Murphy was assigned to represent Mr. Elder

and Mr. Weaver he met with both of them simultaneously. Mr. Murphy
had several meetings with Mr. Elder.

The matter of a potential

conflict of interest was discussed.
17.

Mr. Weaver and Mr. Elder have been and are good

friends and have known one another for many years.

They work

together.
18. Part of the discussion Mr. Murphy had with Mr. Elder
and Mr. Weaver concerned the possibility of one of them testifying
against the other. Because of their friendship neither was willing
to do that.

Inasmuch as neither was going to testify against the

other, the two defendants were satisfied there was no conflict.
Mr. Murphy was satisfied that no actual conflict existed.
19. Both Mr. Elder and Mr. Weaver agreed that Mr. Murphy
could represent both of them.
20. Mr. Murphy pursued a relatively vigorous defense for
Mr. Elder and Mr. Weaver until trial time.

There had been an

evidentiary hearing concerning defendant's request to have evidence
suppressed.
21. Mr. Elder, the defendant, is an intelligent person.
He operates a business.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court strictly followed Rule 11, Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure in taking the guilty pleas.
2. The defendant, Greg D. Elder, entered an intelligent,
knowing and voluntary guilty plea.
3.

There has been no showing that Mr. Murphy acted

incompetently as counsel for defendant Greg D. Elder.

4. There has been no showing that a conflict of interest
existed,
5.

The Court

finds that there was not an actual

conflict.
6. There has been no prejudice to Greg D. Elder arising
out of the arrangement whereby Michael Murphy represented both Greg
D. Elder and a co-defendant in the case.
WHEREFORE, defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas was and is denied.
DATED this

^L/

day of May, 1992.

"JUDGE^
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Concerning
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, with postage prepaid
thereon, to Nick Porterfield, Attorney for Defendant, at 75 East
400 South, Suite 203, Salt Lake City, Utah
of May, 1992.

84111, this \°^

day

